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The National Question of East Turkistan: Petition to the Special Committee on Decolonization with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

Submitted by: The East Turkistan Government-in-Exile and the East Turkistan National Movement

5 May 2026

To: The Chairperson of the Special Committee on Decolonization

CC: H.E. Mr. António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations

The Secretariat and Bureau of the C-24

The President of the General Assembly

The Chairperson and Rapporteur of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly

The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

The Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence

1. The People's Republic of China is the only power on earth actively expanding a colonial project in the twenty-first century.¹ On 12 March 2026, the National People's Congress adopted the "*Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress*," codifying the erasure of all distinct peoples and cultures into a single Chinese identity and criminalizing any assertion of distinct identity — a law with devastating implications for East Turkistan, Tibet, Southern Mongolia, and all non-Chinese peoples under PRC rule.² Resolution 2625 (XXV) declares that the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention. The 2026 law is the

¹ Michael Clarke, "Xinjiang in the 21st Century: Surveillance, Social Reengineering and Settler Colonialism in Xi Jinping's 'New Era,'" in *Critical Issues in Contemporary China: Decoding Xi Jinping's 'New Era'*, 3rd edition (London, Routledge, 2024), pp. 95–116, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003227014-6>.

² People's Republic of China, Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, adopted by the National People's Congress, 12 March 2026, effective 1 July 2026. <https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/ethnic-unity-and-progress-law/>.

legislative instrument of precisely that violation. The era of colonialism has not ended —it is being legislated. Yet the national question of East Turkistan has never been placed on the agenda of any United Nations body concerned with decolonization across four consecutive International Decades spanning forty years. This petition is submitted to end that silence and to assert the inalienable right of the peoples of East Turkistan to self-determination, decolonization, and the restoration of their national independence.

Executive Summary

2. The East Turkistan Government-in-Exile, established on 14 September 2004 to restore the sovereignty and independence of East Turkistan, together with the East Turkistan National Movement, submit this petition on behalf of the Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and all other peoples of East Turkistan. The petitioners request that the Special Committee recommend to the General Assembly the recognition of East Turkistan as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This is the first petition on the national question of East Turkistan ever submitted to this Committee.

3. East Turkistan, which the People's Republic of China (PRC) occupies under the colonial designation “Xinjiang”³ — literally meaning “New Territory” — was invaded on 12 October 1949 and occupied by military force.⁴ In the 1887 *An English and Chinese Dictionary* compiled by Qing official Kwong Ki Chiu, “Xinjiang” is the translation given for “Colony” and “to relocate to Xinjiang” for “Colonize.”⁵ No treaty of cession, plebiscite, or other instrument reflecting the free and genuine will of the peoples of East Turkistan to accept Chinese rule exists.

4. The petition sets out the historical sovereignty of East Turkistan and illegality of the Chinese invasion, the geographic and ethnic distinctness of its people, the colonial character of the Chinese occupation, the systematic denial and suppression of the right to self-determination, the ongoing genocide and mass enslavement, the legal basis for decolonization, and comparable precedents, concluding with specific requests within the Committee's mandate.

³ Stanley W. Toops, “Xinjiang (Eastern Turkistan): Names, Regions, Landscapes, and Futures,” in *Changing China*, Chiao-min Hsieh, ed. (Boulder, Westview Press, 2003; Routledge, 2018), pp. 411–421.

⁴ “Cable, Mao Zedong to Comrade Filippov [Stalin],” 25 October 1949, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, eds., *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao* [Mao Zedong's Military Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC], vol. 1 (Beijing, Junshi kexue chubanshe; Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2010), pp. 53–54, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/176641>.

⁵ Kwong Ki Chiu, *An English and Chinese Dictionary* (Shanghai, 1887), p. 67, <https://archive.org/details/englishchinesedi00kwon>.

I. The Sovereignty of East Turkistan and the Illegality of the Chinese Invasion

5. East Turkistan is an occupied country in Central Asia with a documented history of independent statehood spanning over three thousand years,⁶ inhabited by Turkic and Indo-European peoples — the ancestors of today's Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek peoples — for over six thousand years.⁷ The toponym 'Turkistan,' meaning "Land of the Turks," has been associated with the territory since the rise of the Kok Turk Khaganate in the sixth century CE,⁸ with 'Eastern Turkestan' appearing in European scholarship as early as 1730, predating the Manchu Qing invasion.⁹ Throughout much of its history, East Turkistan was governed by a succession of sovereign Indo-European and Turkic states, such as the ancient city states of the Tarim Basin, the Hun ("Xiongnu") Empire, the Kok Turk Khaganate, the Uyghur Khaganate, the Qarakhanid State, the Idikut Uyghur State, the Chaghatai Khanate, the Turpan and Yarkent Khanate, and the State of Yette Sheher,¹⁰ which received diplomatic recognition from and concluded treaties with the Ottoman, Russian, and British empires.¹¹

6. As with all nations, East Turkistan experienced intermittent periods of foreign invasion and occupation, but its peoples consistently re-established their independence. When East Turkistan fell under Manchu Qing suzerainty in 1759, its peoples waged forty-two major uprisings between 1759 and 1863 before re-establishing independence as the State of Yette Sheher in late 1864.¹² After the Russian-supported Qing invasion of 1876-1877,¹³ East

⁶ Tomas Larsen Høisæter, "Politics and Nomads: The Emergence of the Silk Road Exchange in the Tarim Basin Region during Late Prehistory (2000–400 BCE)," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 80, No. 2 (2017), pp. 339–363, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X17000507>.

⁷ Turghun Almas, *Uyghurlar [The Uyghurs]* (Ürümchi, Xinjiang Youth Publishing House, 1989); Hui Li et al., "Genetic landscape of Eurasia and 'admixture' in Uyghurs," *American Journal of Human Genetics*, vol. 85, No. 6 (December 2009), pp. 934–937, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajhg.2009.10.024>; Fan Zhang and others, "The genomic origins of the Bronze Age Tarim Basin mummies," *Nature*, vol. 599 (2021), pp. 256–261, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-04052-7>.

⁸ Yutaka Yoshida and Takao Moriyasu, "麹氏高昌国時代ソグド文女奴隷売買文書" [Documents of the Sogdian Slave Trade during the Koji Clan's Gaochangoku Era], (Kobe City, University of Foreign Studies), No. 19 (1988), pp. 1–50, <https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R000000004-I2952542>.

⁹ Johann von Strahlenberg, *Das Nord-und Ostliche Theil von Europa und Asia* (1730), p. 50; Joseph de Guines, *Histoire générale des Huns, Mongols, Turcs, et des autres Tartares occidentaux* (Paris, 1756), pp. 413, 437, 494.

¹⁰ Muhammad Emin Bughra, *Sherqiy Turkistan Tarixi [History of East Turkistan]* (Kashmir, 1941); Turghun Almas, *Uyghurlar [The Uyghurs]* (Ürümchi, Xinjiang Youth Publishing House, 1989); James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, revised and updated edition (New York, Columbia University Press, 2021).

¹¹ Roman Pochekaev, "Trade treaties of Russian and British empires with Yattishar: historical and legal study," *RUDN Journal of Law*, vol. 25, No. 3 (2021), pp. 527–544, <https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2337-2021-25-3-527-544>.

¹² Mozammel Haque, "Eastern Turkestan: A Muslim State Never a Part of China," *The Muslim World League Journal*, vol. 22, No. 2 (August 1994), pp. 21–23, https://turkistanilibrary.com/sites/default/files/vol_22_no_2_1994.pdf.

¹³ Louis E. Frechtling, "Anglo-Russian rivalry in eastern Turkistan, 1863–1881," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vol. 26, No. 3 (1939), pp. 471–489, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068373908730924>.

Turkistan was illegally annexed as “Xinjiang” in 1884.¹⁴ Following the Qing collapse in 1912, uprisings erupted across East Turkistan, including Qumul (1912), Turpan (1915), Kucha (1917), and Kashgar (1923).¹⁵ In 1931, a major uprising in Qumul ignited a nationwide anti-colonial liberation movement that led to the re-establishment of sovereign statehood on 12 November 1933 as the East Turkistan Republic, formally adopting the collective national autonym “East Turkistani” (*Sherqiy Türkistanlik*).¹⁶ This Republic was crushed by Soviet-backed Chinese forces in April 1934.¹⁷ In 1937, an independent government was briefly re-established before being crushed again by direct Soviet military intervention.¹⁸ The peoples of East Turkistan re-established sovereignty again on 12 November 1944 as the East Turkistan Republic.¹⁹

7. At the time of the Chinese communist invasion, the East Turkistan Republic (ETR) was a functioning independent state satisfying all four criteria for statehood under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, recognized as declaratory of customary international law binding on all states. East Turkistan possessed a permanent population of seven million;²⁰ a defined territory of 1,828,418 square kilometers confirmed by China’s own records;²¹ a functioning government with a multi-ethnic national army including Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Sibe, and Mongol soldiers, demonstrating broad popular support for independence across all peoples

¹⁴ Stanley W. Toops, “Xinjiang (Eastern Turkistan): Names, Regions, Landscapes, and Futures,” in *Changing China*, Chiao-min Hsieh, ed. (Boulder, Westview Press, 2003; Routledge, 2018), pp. 411–421.

¹⁵ Central Intelligence Group, “Military Information: Sinkiang Rebellions 1931-1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang,” Intelligence Report, 5 December 1946, declassified 22 March 2001, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R000100660009-3.pdf>.

¹⁶ Ondřej Klimeš, “Discourse of the East Turkestani Nation,” in *Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c.1900–1949* (Leiden, Brill, 2015), pp. 128-133; see also Ondřej Klimeš, “Nationalism and modernism in the East Turkestan Republic, 1933–34,” *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 34, No. 2 (2015), pp. 162–176, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2014.976947>.

¹⁷ “The Eastern Turkistan Republic (1933–1934) in Historical Perspective,” in *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia* (Routledge, 2013), pp. 133–164; Ghulamuddin Pahta, “Soviet-Chinese Collaboration in Eastern Turkestan: The Case of the 1933 Uprising,” *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal*, vol. 11, No. 2 (1990), pp. 243–253, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02666959008716168>.

¹⁸ Central Intelligence Group, “Military Information: Sinkiang Rebellions 1931-1937,” <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R000100660009-3.pdf>. See also: Hasanli, *Soviet Policy in Xinjiang*, Lexington Books, 2021, pp. 60-68. Soviet archives document the deployment of Red Army troops, tanks, and aircraft against East Turkistani forces. Over 80,000 East Turkistanis were killed and 300,000 arrested.

¹⁹ Linda Benson, “The Establishment of the East Turkestan Republic,” in *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949* (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 45.

²⁰ East Turkistan Republic, “Struggle for the Motherland,” (“Signs of Unrest in Tihwa,” American Consul J. Hall Paxton to the Secretary of State, Urumchi, 13 January 1947, enclosure no. 2), <https://east-turkistan.net/struggle-for-the-motherland-1946/>.

²¹ Chinese Ministry of Information, *China Handbook 1937–1945*, revised and enlarged with 1946 supplement (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 1. East Turkistan (listed as “Sinkiang”) with an area of 1,828,418 square kilometers.

of East Turkistan;²² and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention confirms that statehood is independent of recognition by other states.²³ That the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party found it necessary to assassinate the ETR's leadership in August 1949 confirms that a sovereign government still existed.

8. The invasion was premeditated and is documented by its own perpetrators. On 27 June 1949, Stalin instructed the Chinese Communist Party that “one should not put off occupation” of East Turkistan and that the Chinese population, which “does not exceed 5%” should be increased “to 30% by means of resettling the Chinese.”²⁴ In August-September 1949, the Soviet Union assassinated the ETR's most senior leadership, along with over thirty senior officials, in violation of Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations.²⁵ On 26 September 1949, Mao requested Soviet aircraft to move 500,000 troops into East Turkistan, warning that without Soviet assistance the invasion would have to be postponed.²⁶

9. The Chinese communists invaded East Turkistan on 12 October 1949, eleven days after declaring the PRC.²⁷ Mao cabled Stalin on the day of the invasion requesting urgent fuel and aircraft for East Turkistan “to be occupied as quickly as possible.”²⁸ Nine days later, he ordered the word “occupation” censored from all reporting.²⁹ The PRC's own conduct — armed invasion, disbanding the ETR's national army, executing its military and civilian

²² Max Oidtmann, “Imperial legacies and revolutionary legends: the Sibe cavalry company, the Eastern Turkestan Republic, and historical memories in Xinjiang,” *Saksaha: A Journal of Manchu Studies*, vol. 12 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.3998/saksaha.13401746.0012.005>.

²³ Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934, <https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.html>.

²⁴ “Memorandum of Conversation between Stalin and CCP Delegation,” 27 June 1949, APRF: F. 45, Op. 1, D. 329, Ll. 1–7, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113380>.

²⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “The Soviet-Sponsored Uprising in Kuldja / The Establishment of the East Turkestan's People's Republic,” Intelligence Report, 13 April 1953, declassified 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00047R000200650005-2.pdf>; Nikita Danilin, “Девять заповедей Уйгурии: Почему Восточный Туркестан превратился в СУАР и не стал 17-й республикой СССР” [Nine Commandments of Uyghuria: Why Eastern Turkestan Became the XUAR and Did Not Become the 17th Republic of the USSR], *Медиазона Центральная Азия*, 17 December 2021, <https://mediazona.ca/article/2021/12/17/vtr2>.

²⁶ “Cable with Message from Mao Zedong to Stalin,” 26 September 1949, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 332, ll. 54–56, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/176341>.

²⁷ “Letter from Cde. Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin] via Kovalev,” 25 October 1949, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 333, ll. 25–28, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/176322>.

²⁸ “Ciphered Telegram No. 58986 from Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin],” 12 October 1949, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 332, ll. 0117–0118, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/176343>.

²⁹ Mao Zedong, “解放军进入新疆的消息及评论不要有‘占领’字样” [News and Commentary on the PLA's Entry into Xinjiang Should Not Use the Word “Occupation”], 21 October 1949, in 毛泽东民族工作文选 [Mao Zedong's Selected Works on Ethnic Affairs], (Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2014), p. 42.

leadership, and censoring the word “occupation” — confirms the nature of what occurred and constitutes recognition by conduct of the state it destroyed.

10. With its leadership assassinated and its command structure destroyed, the East Turkistan Republic was overthrown on 22 December 1949, and its national army absorbed into the occupying forces.³⁰ While promising “national regional autonomy,” the PRC subjected the ETR’s officers to “re-education,” and executed military and civilian leaders across East Turkistan.³¹ Wang Zhen, the PLA commander responsible for the occupation of East Turkistan, wrote to Mao describing the Uyghurs as a “troublemaking minority” that should be “thoroughly wiped out.”³² In January 1952, Burhan Shahidi, the Chinese-appointed colonial governor of East Turkistan, announced that over 120,000 “enemies of the people” had been liquidated by the PLA since 1949.³³ An additional 30,000 were reported killed by March 1954.³⁴

11. Under Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, a territory is occupied when placed under the authority of a hostile army, regardless of whether it is called “liberation,” “administration,” or “occupation” and regardless of whether it has received Security Council approval.³⁵ Despite the PRC officially describing its invasion and occupation of East Turkistan as a “peaceful liberation,”³⁶ the assassination of the ETR’s leadership, the armed invasion, and the killing of over 150,000 people in the first five years establish beyond question that the occupation was belligerent. No sovereignty arises from an illegal belligerent occupation.³⁷

³⁰ Wang Zhen, “新疆共产党组织的建立是新疆人民政治生活中的重大事件” [“The Establishment of the Communist Party Organization in Xinjiang Is a Major Event in the Political Life of the People of Xinjiang”], 23 December 1949, in 新疆工作文献选编 (1949–2010) [Selected Documents on Work in Xinjiang (1949–2010)], (Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2010), pp. 33–37.

³¹ Roostam Sadri, “The Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan: A Commemorative Review,” *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal*, vol. 5, No. 2 (1984), pp. 294–319, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02666958408715902>.

³² Tom Cliff, “Xinjiang Today: Wang Zhen Rides Again?,” *Made in China Journal*, 17 May 2018, <https://madeinchinajournal.com/2018/05/17/xinjiang-today-wang-zhen-rides-again-2/>.

³³ “Burhan Shahidi,” *Central Asia Review*, vol. 7, No. 1 (1959), p. 95, <https://pahar.in/pahar/Journals/Central%20Asian%20Review%201954-1968/1959%20Central%20Asian%20Review%20Vol%207,%20Nos.%201,%202,%203%20and%204%20s.pdf>

³⁴ Donald H. McMillen, “Military Policies, 1949–66,” in *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1979), p. 102, citing *Xinjiang Daily*, 10 March 1954.

³⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Occupation and international humanitarian law: Questions and answers,” 4 August 2004, <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/occupation-international-humanitarian-law-questions>.

³⁶ James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, “Political history and strategies of control, 1884–1978,” in *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland*, S. Frederick Starr, ed. (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 2004; Routledge, 2015), pp. 63–98.

³⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Occupation and international humanitarian law: Questions and answers,” 4 August 2004, <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/occupation-international-humanitarian-law-questions>.

II. Geographic and Ethnic Distinctness, the Illegitimacy of China's Claim, and the Colonial Regime

12. East Turkistan comprises 1,828,418 square kilometers, a distinct geographic unit in Central Asia encompassing the Tarim, Dzungarian, and Turpan–Kengsu basins — a landscape of deserts, oases, and steppes enclosed by mountain ranges,³⁸ and separated from China by the narrow Hexi Corridor, where the Great Wall terminates at Jiayuguan. Both the *Ming Shi* and the Qianlong Emperor's *Complete Atlas of the Xiyu* (1759) designate Jiayuguan³⁹ as the border between China and the “Xiyu (Western Countries),”⁴⁰ with East Turkistan being the first territory beyond that border.

13. Chinese dynasties classified the polities of East Turkistan as foreign states: texts such as the *Shiji*,⁴¹ *Hou Hanshu*,⁴² and *Da Tang Xiyu Ji*,⁴³ list them as independent “*guo* (kingdoms/states)” with their own kings, armies, and populations, many of which defied the Chinese. The *Song Shi* lists kingdoms in East Turkistan as “*Waiguo* (Foreign States),”⁴⁴ while the *Ming Shi* similarly records them as foreign states with independent armies and rulers.⁴⁵

14. The Qing was a Manchu empire, not a Chinese state, and China was a subject territory of that empire.⁴⁶ No principle of international law permits a former subject territory to claim sovereignty over its former imperial master's other colonial possessions. Under the Qing, East

³⁸ East Turkistan Government in Exile, “East Turkistan at a Glance,” last updated December 2023, <https://east-turkistan.net/east-turkistan-at-a-glance/>

³⁹ Zhang Tingyu and others, eds., “列传第二百十七 西域一” [Biographies 217: Western Regions I], in 明史 [History of the Ming], <https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&chapter=490388>; Wang Yao, *The Story of Xinjiang Revealed through Old Maps (1759–1912)*, (Los Angeles, Bridge21 Publications, 2021), p. 71.

⁴⁰ “西域” [Xiyu], in 辞海 [Cihai / Chinese Encyclopedia] (Shanghai, Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 1979), p. 540. The term is defined as “Western Countries” or “Western States.”

⁴¹ Sima Qian, “大宛列传” [Account of Dayuan], in 史记 [Shiji / Records of the Grand Historian], c. 94 BCE, <https://ctext.org/shiji/da-wan-lie-zhuan/zh>.

⁴² “西域传” [Chapter on the Western Regions], in 後漢書 [Hou Hanshu / Book of the Later Han], c. 445 CE, translated by John E. Hill, 2nd edition (2003), https://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/hhshu/hou_han_shu.html.

⁴³ Xuanzang, 大唐西域記 [The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions], c. 646 CE, https://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/sutra/chi_pdf/sutra20/T51n2087.pdf

⁴⁴ Toqto'a, et al. “Waiguo 6” [Foreign States 6] in *Song Shi* [History of the Song Dynasty]. Vol. 490, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1977, <https://chinesenotes.com/songshi/songshi490.html>.

⁴⁵ Zhang Tingyu and others, eds., “列传第二百十七 西域一” [Biographies 217: Western Regions I], in 明史 [Mingshi / History of the Ming Dynasty], <https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&chapter=490388>.

⁴⁶ Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Pamela Kyle Crossley, “The Qing Empire: Three Governments in One State and the Stability of Manchu Rule,” in *The Oxford World History of Empires, Volume Two: The History of Empires*, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang, C. A. Bayly, and Walter Scheidel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 716–740.

Turkistan was administered as a military colony by the “Lifanyuan” (“Court of Colonial Affairs”) as an Outer Dependency, not as part of China.⁴⁷ Senior Qing officials openly opposed the reconquest of 1876–1877 and the subsequent illegal annexation of East Turkistan; Grand Secretary Li Hongzhang dismissed the territory as “useless,” arguing that Chinese were too few and the territory could not support Chinese administration.⁴⁸

15. The colonial intent of the Chinese state predates the PRC. Sun Yat-sen, revered by the ROC as the “Father of the Nation” and by the PRC as the “Forerunner of the Revolution,” declared in his 1920 treatise *The International Development of China* that colonization of East Turkistan was “the most urgent need of the first magnitude,” proposing the settlement of ten million Chinese — including over one million disbanded soldiers — to exploit its resources.⁴⁹

16. Across more than two thousand years of Chinese historiography, East Turkistan was never classified as part of China. The fabrication that East Turkistan is “an inseparable part of China since ancient times” was first articulated in 1959 as a propaganda tool to legitimize the occupation — ten years after the invasion.⁵⁰ It is modern political revisionism with no basis in Chinese or other historical records.

17. The native peoples of East Turkistan are ethnically Turkic, speaking Turkic languages unrelated to Mandarin (Chinese) or any other Sinitic language, using a distinct script, and sharing a civilizational heritage with Central Asia. They share no linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or religious ties to the Chinese. Even the father of modern Chinese nationalism confirmed this distinctness, describing the Muslim Turks of East Turkistan as “alien races” separate from “the Chinese race.”⁵¹ Geographic separateness, ethnic, linguistic and cultural distinctness under Principle IV of Resolution 1541 (XV) are beyond dispute. The “saltwater thesis” has no basis in the Charter or in Resolution 1541. Western Sahara, for instance, shares a land border with Morocco yet remains a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

⁴⁷ Ulrich Theobald, “Lifanyuan 理藩院, the Court of Colonial Affairs,” *ChinaKnowledge.de: An Encyclopaedia on Chinese History, Literature and Art*, 7 May 2011, <http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Terms/lifanyuan.html>.

⁴⁸ Bartosz Kowalski, “Holding an Empire Together: Army, Colonization and State-building in Qing Xinjiang,” *Ming Qing Studies* (2017), pp. 45–70, https://www.academia.edu/download/55307140/MQS2017_45-70_Kowalski.pdf.

⁴⁹ Sun Yatsen, “The Colonization of Mongolia and Sinkiang,” in *The International Development of China*, Shanghai, Commercial Press Ltd, 1920, pp. 10–11. Note: “Sinkiang” is the older western spelling of the Chinese colonial term “Xinjiang” used to describe East Turkistan.

⁵⁰ Zhang Dongyue, “关于新疆历史的几个问题 [Several Issues Concerning the History of Xinjiang],” *民族研究* [Nationality Studies], No. 6, 1959, pp. 16–21.

⁵¹ Sun Yat Sen, “Lecture 1, Nationalism (1924),” in *San Min Chu I, The Three Principles of the People*, Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, 1943, pp. 11–12. Sun listed “Muslim Turks” alongside Mongolians, Manchus, and Tibetans as “alien races” separate from “the Chinese people” whom he described as “a single, pure race” with “common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs.”

18. It is this distinctness that entitles the peoples of East Turkistan to the right to self-determination, and it is this distinctness the PRC is attempting to permanently erase. The 2026 “Ethnic Unity Law” codifies into legislation what has been colonial policy since 1949: the denial of East Turkistan as a nation and the forced assimilation of its people into a single “Chinese nation,”⁵² eliminating the legal basis for any exercise of the right to self-determination.

19. East Turkistan possesses no self-government. All effective political power is monopolized by the Chinese colonists, with native populations confined to subordinate titular roles to manufacture the appearance of self-rule. In 1955, the PRC unilaterally designated East Turkistan as the so-called “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)” — paralleling Denmark’s 1953 reclassification of Greenland as a Danish county to secure its removal from the Non-Self-Governing Territory list in 1954 — presenting a colony as integrated territory to circumvent the right to self-determination. Uyghur and other Turkic officials in the “autonomous region” continue to be purged and imprisoned under the label “two-faced” for any perceived disloyalty to Beijing, confirming that no self-governance exists.⁵³

20. Demographic colonization was state policy from the outset. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organization responsible for colonial subjugation, was established in 1954 with 175,000 personnel and now comprises over 3.25 million.⁵⁴ The Chinese colonist population grew from under five per cent at the time of invasion to over forty-two per cent by 2020 according to China’s own census data, while the native Turkic population fell from over ninety per cent to roughly fifty-five per cent.⁵⁵ This constitutes the most severe case of settler colonization in modern history. The native population is being systematically replaced. In 2022, the PRC appointed as head of its National Ethnic Affairs Commission a Chinese official who had publicly advocated the

⁵² *Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress* (2026), <https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/ethnic-unity-and-progress-law/>.

⁵³ “Xinjiang authorities target Uyghur cadres in ‘dark forces’ crackdown,” *Radio Free Asia*, 1 August 2024, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-authorities-target-uyghur-cadres-dar-forces-crackdown-08012024161904.html>.

⁵⁴ James D. Seymour, “Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan,” *Inner Asia*, vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 171–193, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615556>; “China census: Xinjiang’s population jumps 18.3 per cent over past decade as sprawling XPCC conglomerate expands operations,” *South China Morning Post*, 12 May 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210601091436/https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3133228/china-census-xinjiangs-population-jumps-183-cent-over-past>.

⁵⁵ Stanley Toops, “The Population Landscape of Xinjiang/East Turkestan,” *Inner Asia*, vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 155–170, <https://doi.org/10.1163/146481700793647797>; “Press conference on the Census Results of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region from the Seventh National Population Census,” *Tianshan Net*, 14 June 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210614121821/http://english.ts.cn/system/2021/06/14/036646163.shtml>.

settlement of 50 million Han Chinese in East Turkistan and Tibet, confirming that demographic colonization remains an active colonial strategy.⁵⁶

21. The Chinese state has combined mass colonist migration with the systematic statistical suppression of the native Turkic population.⁵⁷ The PRC's own statistics are irreconcilable: official Chinese data reported 12.7 million Uyghurs in 2018, yet the 2020 census revised this to 11.6 million — over one million Uyghurs erased from the record in two years,⁵⁸ while the Chinese colonist population increased by 3.1 million in the same period.⁵⁹ Independent demographic research confirms these discrepancies are evidence of systematic underreporting. The East Turkistan Republic declared a population of seven million Turkic peoples in 1946; China's 1953 census reported fewer than five million — a figure irreconcilable with every prior estimate, including China's own.⁶⁰ A peer-reviewed demographic study, using growth rates observed in the early 1990s, projected that the Turkic population of East Turkistan would reach approximately 18 million by 2020.⁶¹ China's 2020 census reported only 13.5 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz combined — a shortfall of 4.5 million from even this conservative estimate. Chinese state media itself reported that between 2016 and 2017, DNA samples were collected from 36 million people in East Turkistan — a figure irreconcilable with official census data.⁶² These systematic discrepancies demand independent investigation under international supervision.

⁵⁶ Aaron Glasserman, "Touting 'Ethnic Fusion,' China's New Top Official for Minority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural Difference," *ChinaFile*, 24 February 2023, <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/touting-ethnic-fusion-chinas-new-top-official-minority-affairs-envisions>.

⁵⁷ "China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang," *South China Morning Post*, 15 June 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210614223226/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3137252/china-census-migration-drives-han-population-growth-xinjiang>.

⁵⁸ "So-called Xinjiang population report full of lies," *China Daily* (Global Edition), 4 September 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20200904032806/https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202009/04/WS5f517c1ca310675eafc576cc.html>; "Facts about Xinjiang's population and ethnic groups," *CGTN*, 2 September 2022, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220902082748/https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-09-02/Graphics-Facts-about-Xinjiang-s-population-and-ethnic-groups-1cvVZvnuI8/index.html>.

⁵⁹ "China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang," *South China Morning Post*, 15 June 2021.

⁶⁰ East Turkistan Republic, "Struggle for the Motherland," ("Signs of Unrest in Tihwa," American Consul J. Hall Paxton to the Secretary of State, Urumchi, 13 January 1947, enclosure no. 2), <https://east-turkistan.net/struggle-for-the-motherland-1946/>; Prior estimates consistently exceeded China's 1953 census: the colonial administration assessed 6 million (1931), the postal administration 8 million (1937), a Comintern memorandum 14–15 million (1934), and Mao himself declared 9 million (1949). At a sustained 2.5 per cent annual growth rate, the Turkic population would have reached approximately 38.5 million by 2014. See East Turkistan Government in Exile, "The Population of East Turkistan: Historical and Contemporary Analysis," 18 November 2023, <https://east-turkistan.net/the-population-of-east-turkistan-historical-and-contemporary-analysis/>.

⁶¹ Attané, Isabelle, and Youssef Courbage, "Transitional Stages and Identity Boundaries: The Case of Ethnic Minorities in China," *Population and Environment* 21, no. 3 (2000): 257–280, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27503703>.

⁶² Sui-Lee Wee, "China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise," *The New York Times*, 21 February 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html>.

III. The Systematic Denial and Suppression of the Right to Self-Determination

22. The denial and suppression of the East Turkistani people's right to self-determination has been deliberate, premeditated, and sustained through systematic repression at the domestic, regional, and global levels.

23. On 4 February 1949, while the East Turkistan Republic was still a functioning state, Soviet Vice Premier Mikoyan advised Mao to grant "autonomy and not independence to the national minorities," recording that Mao "had no intention of giving independence to anybody whatsoever."⁶³ Mikoyan described the East Turkistan independence movement as "a national movement against oppression" triggered by Chinese government policy that "does not present rights of self-rule." The Soviet Union, which had no authority over East Turkistan's sovereignty, negotiated the elimination of East Turkistani independence with the Chinese Communist Party in pursuit of its own strategic interests. The denial of East Turkistani people's right to self-determination was thus decided by two foreign powers before the Chinese communist invasion had begun — a betrayal of the CCP's own 1931 constitution, which guaranteed the right to "complete separation" and to "the formation of an independent state" of all non-Chinese peoples in the former Qing empire.⁶⁴ On 7 September 1949, Zhou Enlai declared that "every ethnic group has the right to self-determination — this is beyond question."⁶⁵ One month later, the CCP Central Committee directed that the "right to self-determination" should no longer be emphasized.⁶⁶ A week after that, the CCP invaded East Turkistan.

24. Resistance to the occupation was immediate and continuous. On 22 December 1949, Uyghurs in Khotan took up arms against the Chinese invasion.⁶⁷ In March 1951, over fifty Uyghur and other Turkic officials gathered in Ghulja — the former capital of the East

⁶³ "Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong," 4 February 1949, APRF: F 39, Op. 1, D. 39, Ll. 54–62, Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113318>.

⁶⁴ "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic," 7 November 1931, art. 14, <http://worldstatesmen.org/Chinese-Soviet-Republic-Const1931.pdf>.

⁶⁵ "我们主张民族区域自治，把各民族团结成一个大家庭" [We Advocate For Ethnic Regional Autonomy, Uniting All Ethnic Groups into One Big Family], 7 September 1949, in 新疆工作文献选编 (1949–2010) [Selected Documents on Work in Xinjiang (1949–2010)], (Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2010), pp. 403–406.

⁶⁶ "中共中央关于少数民族'自决权'问题给二野前委的指示" (Instructions to the Second Field Army's Front Committee on the Issue of "Self-Determination" for Ethnic Minorities), 5 October 1949, in 建国以来重要文献选编 (1949–1950) [Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the PRC (1949–1950)], (Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 363–364.

⁶⁷ "基本完成社会主义改造和开始全面建设社会主义时期 (1949.10–1966.5)" [Period of Basically Completing Socialist Transformation and Beginning Comprehensive Socialist Construction (1949.10–1966.5)], in 中国共产党新疆维吾尔自治区和田地区组织史资料 (1949.10–1987.10) [Organizational History Materials of the CCP in the Khotan District, XUAR (1949.10–1987.10)], 1993, p. 213.

Turkistan Republic — and demanded the re-establishment of an independent republic, a national army, and the withdrawal of all Chinese personnel from East Turkistan.⁶⁸ In Kashgar, similar demands for independence were dismissed as “reactionary” by Wang Enmao, a commander of the Chinese occupation forces.⁶⁹ Armed uprisings continued across East Turkistan, undeterred by the imposition of the “XUAR” in 1955.

25. In August 1957, Zhou Enlai explicitly rejected the right to self-determination, stating the PRC “did not need to adopt the policy emphasized at the time of the October Revolution, implementing national self-determination and permitting ethnic separation.”⁷⁰ That same December, Seypidin Azizi, China’s appointed chairman of the “XUAR,” reported that the peoples of East Turkistan were rejecting Chinese rule and “agitating for an independent East Turkistan Republic.”⁷¹ The PRC responded with mass purges in Ürümchi, Ghulja, and Kashgar, targeting over 1,600 Uyghur and other Turkic officials for demanding the right to national self-determination and independence — demands the Chinese labeled “local nationalism.”⁷²

26. During the Cultural Revolution, the East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party was established with the goal of restoring the East Turkistan Republic, gaining some 60,000 members before it was crushed in 1970.⁷³ Resistance continued throughout the 1970s and into the early 1990s, including armed uprisings in Baren (1990), Chöchek-Boretala (1991).⁷⁴

⁶⁸ “基本完成社会主义改造时期 (1949年10月至1956年9月)” [Period of Basically Completing Socialist Transformation (October 1949–September 1956)], in 中国共产党伊宁市历史大事记 (1949.10–1996.10) [*Chronicle of Major Events in the History of the CCP in Ghulja City (1949.10–1996.10)*], (Ürümchi, People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 8–9.

⁶⁹ “在喀什地区党政军民干部大会上的讲话 (节录)” [“Speech at the Kashgar District Party-Government-Military-Civilian Cadre Conference (Excerpt)”], 5 May 1951, in 中国共产党与民族区域自治制度的建立和发展 上册 [*The Chinese Communist Party and the Establishment and Development of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy System, Vol. 1*], 中国共产党历史资料丛书 [CCP Historical Materials Series] (北京 [Beijing], 2000), pp. 304–305.

⁷⁰ Zhou Enlai, “关于我国民族政策的几个问题” [Several Questions on Our Country’s Ethnic Minority Policy], 4 August 1957, in 新疆工作文献选编 (1949–2010) [*Selected Documents on Work in Xinjiang (1949–2010)*], (Beijing, Central Party Literature Press, 2010), pp. 179–201.

⁷¹ “Nomad Tribes Give Trouble to Red China: Agitating for An Independent East Turkistan Republic,” *Associated Press* (Tokyo), 26 December 1957; “How China Reframed East Turkistan’s Independence Struggle to Deny the Right to Self-determination,” *The East Turkistan Post*, 16 December 2025, <https://turkistanpost.com/how-china-reframed-east-turkistans-independence-struggle-to-deny-the-right-to-self-determination/>.

⁷² David Brophy, “The 1957–58 Xinjiang Committee Plenum and the Attack on ‘Local Nationalism,’” *Wilson Center Sources and Methods*, 11 December 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-1957-58-xinjiang-committee-plenum-and-the-attack-local-nationalism>.

⁷³ Michael P Evans, “A Nearly Perfect Storm: The Rise and Fall of the Eastern Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party” (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 2017), <https://www.proquest.com/openview/11e8fd9da1420389db71eea5b201f824/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750>.

⁷⁴ Gardner Bovingdon, “Organized Protests and Violent Events in Xinjiang, 1949–2005,” appendix in *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 174–190.

In March 1996, the CCP Politburo issued Document No. 7 (1996), classified “Top Secret,” directing the state to “use all means to prevent outside separatist forces from making the East Turkistan problem international” and to “divide the outside separatist forces, win over most of them, and alienate the remaining small number and fight against them.”⁷⁵ The chairman of the “XUAR”, Abdulahat Abdurishit, declared that “all methods are acceptable” to suppress the independence movement, including “penetration, propaganda, killing.”⁷⁶

27. The PRC labeled the struggle for national liberation and independence successively as “reactionary,” “local nationalism,” “counter-revolution,” “separatism,” and then “terrorism” after September 2001⁷⁷ — mirroring colonial tactics used by France in Algeria, Indonesia in East Timor, and Portugal in Angola. As early as October 1997, *The Observer* reported that foreign observers believed China’s attempts to link East Turkistan’s independence movement to Islamic fundamentalism were “designed to discredit the movement in Western eyes before it has even become known.”⁷⁸ Two months after September 11, 2001, Beijing introduced the fabricated label “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)” at the United Nations, deliberately and falsely associating East Turkistan’s struggle for national independence with global jihadism and terrorism.⁷⁹ Since the 1990s, East Turkistani organizations and leaders have consistently stated that the East Turkistan cause “has nothing to do with Islamic fundamentalism or extremism” and is solely “one of national liberation.”⁸⁰

28. Regionally, China co-founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 to suppress the East Turkistan independence movement under the false pretext of combatting

⁷⁵ “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document No. 7,” 19 March 1996, classified “Top Secret,” originally translated and published in Human Rights Watch, *China: State Control of Religion, Update #1*, C1001, 1 March 1998, appendix 1, <https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/1998/40266>; full text and original leaked Uyghur version also available at <https://east-turkistan.net/chinese-communist-party-central-committee-document-no-7-1996/>.

⁷⁶ John McCarthy, “Uighurs smoulder under China’s yoke: Though subject to a crackdown, these separatists are unwilling to suffer Tibet’s fate,” *The Guardian* (London), 4 September 1997, p. 12, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/uighurs-smoulder-under-chinas-yoke-though-subject/docview/245187788/se-2>.

⁷⁷ Pablo A. Rodríguez-Merino, “Old ‘counter-revolution,’ new ‘terrorism’: historicizing the framing of violence in Xinjiang by the Chinese state,” *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 38, No. 1 (2019), pp. 27–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1496066>.

⁷⁸ James Meek, “Ancient warriors feel China’s cosh: The Uighurs beat Alexander the Great but Beijing is less easy to throw off,” *The Observer* (London), 12 October 1997, p. 15, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/ancient-warriors-feel-chinas-cosh-uighurs-beat/docview/250338267/se-2>.

⁷⁹ Sean Roberts, “Imaginary Terrorism? The Global War on Terror and the Narrative of the Uyghur Terrorist Threat,” *PONARS Eurasia Working Paper* (Washington, D.C., March 2012), p. 5, https://ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Roberts_WorkingPaper_March2012.pdf.

⁸⁰ “Ethnic Uyghurs of Kazakhstan on ‘Shanghai Five’ Summit,” in Kazakh Report, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 26 August 1999, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1343513.html>; Ghulam Yaghma, “China’s Support to Terrorism to Undermine the Secular East Turkistan Independence Movement” (ITCT Research Paper, June 2023), <https://web.archive.org/web/20230626031323/https://www.itct.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Chinas-Support-to-Terrorism-1.pdf>

the “three evils” — “separatism,” “extremism,” and “terrorism.”⁸¹ Through the SCO, China conducts transnational repression across Central Asia and beyond, banning East Turkistani organizations, criminalizing calls for self-determination and independence, and assassinating, imprisoning, and forcibly deporting activists.⁸² Since 2014, over ninety per cent of the Uyghur population in Tajikistan has been forcibly deported to Chinese custody in East Turkistan, along with thousands from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.⁸³

29. The suppression of the right to self-determination is not a reactive but a premeditated policy. Successive PRC defense white papers from 2008 to 2025 identify East Turkistan independence as a top-tier “security threat,” with the 2019 National Defense Strategy listing “preventing the creation of East Turkistan” as a top defense goal.⁸⁴ In a secret 2018 speech China’s Minister of Public Security identified over four million people in East Turkistan as targets of colonial subjugation for pro-independence sentiment or religious belief.⁸⁵ The right to self-determination is itself treated as a crime.

30. Globally, the PRC has leveraged economic instruments — including the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral lending, and infrastructure dependencies — to cultivate political support across every region represented on the C-24 and in General Assembly voting blocs, systematically constraining the willingness of debtor states to hold it accountable. Multiple studies have documented the correlation between BRI participation and voting alignment with China in the General Assembly on human rights and sovereignty issues.⁸⁶ This

⁸¹ Niva Yau, “China’s Security Management Towards Central Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Central Asia Papers, April 2022, <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/chinas-security-management-towards-central-asia.pdf>

⁸² Bradley Jardine, *Great Wall of Steel: China’s Global Campaign to Suppress the Uyghurs* (Washington, D.C., Wilson Center, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, 2022), https://oxussociety.org/api/media/file/Great-Wall_of_Steel_.pdf.

⁸³ “Uyghur groups want to take China to the International Criminal Court,” *The Economist*, 10 June 2021, <https://www.economist.com/china/2021/06/10/uyghur-groups-want-to-take-china-to-the-international-criminal-court>; Bruce Pannier, “Tajikistan Accused of Helping China in Campaign Against Uyghurs,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 15 June 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/31309627.html>.

⁸⁴ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s National Defense in 2008, 2010, 2014; China’s National Defense in the New Era* (2019); *China’s National Security in the New Era* (2025).

⁸⁵ Zhao Kezhi, “Speech Given While Listening to the Report on Public Security and Stability Work in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region,” classified internal speech, 15 June 2018, leaked in the Xinjiang Police Files, <https://www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Zhao-Kezhi-Speech-Given-While-Listening-to-the-Report-on-Public-Security-and-Stability-Work-on-the-Xinjiang-Autonomous-Region.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Akram, Muhammad, Fawad Ali, Muhammad Shah, Nafid Khan Muhammad, and Mujeeb Khan, “Debt Diplomacy and Sovereignty: Analyzing China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Africa & South Asia,” *Policy Journal of Social Science Review* 3, no. 1 (2025): 402–419; see also AidData, “Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects,” William & Mary, 2021, <https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road>; Georg Strüver, “What Friends Are Made Of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 2 (2016): 170–191, <https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12050>.

structural compromise of the very states responsible for upholding the right to self-determination must not be permitted to override the obligations of the Charter and the mandate of this Committee.

31. The East Turkistani people have never accepted Chinese rule, maintaining continuous resistance from 1949 to the present, including over one hundred documented uprisings and protests between 1949 and 2005.⁸⁷ Organized resistance continued until July 2014, after which it was met with genocide.⁸⁸ Resistance persists today through East Turkistan's peoples and organizations in exile, and this petition itself. That East Turkistan has never appeared on the agenda of any UN body concerned with decolonization in over seven decades is not merely a failure but a historic injustice this Committee has the power and the obligation to correct.

IV. Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity

32. The PRC is executing a systematic campaign of genocide and crimes against humanity designed to destroy the peoples of East Turkistan. Genocide is the ultimate instrument of colonial consolidation: the permanent elimination of a people so that the right to self-determination can never be exercised. The evidence below is presented not as a separate human rights complaint but as proof that the PRC is employing genocide as the means to make its colonial domination of East Turkistan irreversible.

33. Genocidal intent was present from the first day of occupation. Wang Zhen declared he would “kill so many that Xinjiang won't produce a single counterrevolutionary for fifty years.”⁸⁹ That intent has never ceased. In April 2014, Xi Jinping directed that “absolutely no mercy” be shown, unleashing the “organs of dictatorship” under the pretext of an “all-out struggle against terrorism, infiltration, and separatism” in East Turkistan.⁹⁰ On 23 May 2014, China launched the “Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism,” also known as the “People's War on Terrorism,” the euphemism for a campaign of genocide now entering its

⁸⁷ Gardner Bovingdon, “Organized Protests and Violent Events in Xinjiang, 1949–2005,” appendix in *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 174–190.

⁸⁸ “【37人被捕】新疆莎車縣縣委常委、公安局長涉賄” [37 Arrested: Yarkand County Party Standing Committee Member and Public Security Bureau Chief Suspected of Bribery], *Apple Daily* (Hong Kong), 25 January 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210621185320/https://hk.appledaily.com/china/20180125/TORNWXTFL5FTXQI2IJI7GIWUSQ/>.

⁸⁹ “邓小平替王震撑腰先否定刁仲勋再否定胡耀邦” [Deng Xiaoping Backed Wang Zhen, First Negating Xi Zhongxun Then Negating Hu Yaobang], *Radio Free Asia*, 10 July 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuannan/yehuazhongnannhai/gx-07102019133942.html>.

⁹⁰ Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” *The New York Times*, 16 November 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.

thirteenth year.⁹¹ In August 2017, a CCP official published the operational doctrine on Xinhua: “Break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins.”⁹² In February 2025, the Chinese Red Culture Research Association glorified Wang Zhen’s mass killings as a governing model, declaring “in matters of national interest, force is truth.”⁹³ China is not merely committing genocide — it is institutionally celebrating it.

34. The constituent acts satisfy every element of Article II of the Genocide Convention:

(a) *Killing members of the group*: Chinese military and security forces carried out a large-scale massacre in Yarkent County on 28 July 2014, in which thousands of Uyghurs were killed.⁹⁴ Deaths in concentration camps are widespread: a police officer confirmed that at least 150 detainees died in a single camp in six months.⁹⁵ UN experts reported in 2021 that detainees are forcibly subjected to blood tests and organ examinations and registered in a database of living organ sources.⁹⁶ Testimony before the United States Congress estimated that between 25,000 and 50,000 Uyghur and other Turkic detainees may be killed annually for their organs with crematoriums constructed adjacent to camps to destroy evidence.⁹⁷ In December 2024, the Xinjiang Health Commission published

⁹¹ Human Rights Watch, “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots: China’s Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims,” 19 April 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting>.

⁹² “Xinjiang’s Party chief wages ‘people’s war’ against terrorism,” *Xinhua*, 26 May 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140526172859/https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/26/content_17541318.htm; see also Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” 10 September 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/10/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs>.

⁹³ “王震治理新疆：什么‘东突’、‘西突’，统统‘突突’！” [Wang Zhen’s Governance of Xinjiang: As for ‘East Turkistan,’ ‘West Turkistan’ — or Whatever Else — Machine-Gun Them All Down!], 红色文化网 [Red Culture Network], 3 February 2025, archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20250327205851/https://www.hsw.org.cn/wzzx/llyd/ls/2025-02-03/92350.html>. Chinese Red Culture Research Association is part of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

⁹⁴ “【37人被捕】新疆莎车县县委常委、公安局长涉贿” [37 Arrested: Yarkand County Party Standing Committee Member and Public Security Bureau Chief Suspected of Bribery], *Apple Daily* (Hong Kong), 25 January 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210621185320/https://hk.appledaily.com/china/20180125/TORNWXTFL5FTXQI2IJI7GIWUSQ/>. The article reports that sources close to military intelligence stated that the July 28, 2014 Yarkand incident was a massacre in which 3,000 to 5,000 people across four villages were killed. “At Least 2,000 Uyghurs Killed” in Yarkand Violence: Exile Leader,” *Radio Free Asia*, 5 August 2014, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/yarkand-08052014150547.html>.

⁹⁵ “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” *Radio Free Asia*, 29 October 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html>

⁹⁶ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: UN human rights experts alarmed by ‘organ harvesting’ allegations,” 14 June 2021, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/china-un-human-rights-experts-alarmed-organ-harvesting-allegations>

⁹⁷ Ethan Gutmann, Written Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting,” 1334 Longworth House Office Building, 20 March 2024, https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2024-03-20-written_testimony_of_ethan_gutmann.pdf; see also Ethan Gutmann, *The Xinjiang Procedure* (Armin Lear Press, 2026).

plans to triple organ transplant hospitals in East Turkistan from 2 to 8 by 2030, despite the voluntary organ donation rate being seven times lower than China's national average.⁹⁸ Countless Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples have been sentenced to death and executed following unfair trials on charges of “terrorism” or “separatism,” with intellectuals, political leaders, and religious figures among those targeted for elimination.⁹⁹

- (b) *Causing serious bodily or mental harm*: Detainees across more than 1,400 internment facilities are subjected to systematic torture in designated interrogation rooms, including electroshock, shackling to “tiger chairs,” and beatings with metal and electric prods.¹⁰⁰ Systematic rape and sexual violence are documented, including gang rape and the use of electrified instruments as tools of sexual torture.¹⁰¹ China's own 2020 White Paper acknowledged an average of 1.29 million people per year sent to so-called “vocational training” camps from 2014 to 2019 — the largest arbitrary internment since the Second World War.¹⁰²
- (c) *Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction*: The East Turkistani people, despite constituting less than two per cent of the population under PRC control, account for over one-third of the PRC's entire prison population.¹⁰³ Between 2014 and 2019, 578,500 Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples were

⁹⁸ “关于印发新疆维吾尔自治区人体器官移植医院设置规划（2024—2030年）的通知” [Notice on the Plan for the Establishment of Human Organ Transplant Hospitals in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (2024–2030)], 新卫医发〔2024〕6号, 18 December 2024, <https://web.archive.org/web/20250415070235/https://wjw.xinjiang.gov.cn/hfpc/yjgg/202412/5dbccfdddae4449bac11e380e0481800.shtml>; see also “China ‘to triple number of Uyghur organ-harvesting centres,’” *The Telegraph*, 3 July 2025, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/07/03/china-triples-forced-organ-harvesting-hubs-target-uyghurs/>.

⁹⁹ “China hands two Uyghur ex-government officials death penalty for ‘separatism,’” *France 24*, 7 April 2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210407-china-gives-uyghur-former-government-officials-death-penalty-for-separatism>; “China sentences 55 in Xinjiang mass trial,” *Reuters*, 28 May 2014, <https://reuters.com/article/world/china-sentences-55-in-xinjiang-mass-trial-idUSKBN0E80HX/>.

¹⁰⁰ Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, *The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention*, March 2021, <https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their goal is to destroy everyone’: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape,” *BBC News*, 2 February 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071>.

¹⁰² “China has locked up 8 MILLION people in terrifying ‘re-education’ camps in last six years,” *The Sun*, <https://www.the-sun.com/news/us-news/1495061/china-document-8-million-training-detention-camps/>; State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang,” 17 September 2020, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202009/17/content_WS5f62cef6c6d0f7257693c192.html.

¹⁰³ “1 in 26 Uyghurs jailed, accounting 1/3 of China's prison population” *The Print*, <https://theprint.in/world/1-in-26-uyghurs-jailed-accounting-1-3-of-chinas-prison-population-uyghur-human-rights-project-report/2070134/>.

sentenced to five years or more.¹⁰⁴ Detainees are deprived of adequate food, water, medical care, and shelter, denied food for speaking Uyghur, and subjected to conditions resulting in extreme weight loss of 12 to 40 kilograms.¹⁰⁵ Outside the camps, Uyghurs are transferred to forced labor hundreds of kilometers from their communities, separated from their families, with their homes placed under state control, and their ability to sustain themselves as a community destroyed. A total of 13.75 million instances of forced labour transfers were projected in the 2021 to 2025 five-year plan for East Turkistan — transfers found by UN experts in January 2026 to constitute enslavement as a crime against humanity.¹⁰⁶

- (d) *Imposing measures intended to prevent births*: An estimated 3.7 million births were prevented through coercive birth control in the three decades prior to 2007.¹⁰⁷ Since 2014, forced sterilization, forced IUD placement, and forced abortions caused birth rates in the Kashgar and Khotan regions to collapse by eighty-four per cent between 2015 and 2018, with the Kizilsu setting a near-zero birth rate target for 2020.¹⁰⁸ In 2018, eighty per cent of all net added IUD placements across all territories under PRC control were performed in East Turkistan, despite its population comprising only 1.8 per cent of the total. Chinese government documents ordered the sterilization of up to thirty-four per cent of married women of childbearing age in targeted Uyghur counties in a single year, with these genocidal policies projected to eliminate between 2.6 to 4.5 million Uyghur and other Turkic births within twenty years.¹⁰⁹ Chinese officials have stated the purpose is to “end the dominance of the Uyghur group” in East Turkistan.¹¹⁰ Exceeding China’s

¹⁰⁴ “Imprisonment rate of Uyghurs in China surpasses all other countries, report finds,” *Radio Free Asia*, 2 May 2024, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/imprisonment-rate-report-05022024144951.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, *The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention*, March 2021, <https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Chinas-Breaches-of-the-GC3-2.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ OHCHR, “UN experts alarmed by reports of forced labour of Uyghur, Tibetan and other minorities across China,” 22 January 2026, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/un-experts-alarmed-reports-forced-labour-uyghur-tibetan-and-other-minorities>.

¹⁰⁷ “新疆推行计生政策自治区30年少生370万人” [Xinjiang’s Implementation of Family Planning Policy: 3.7 Million Fewer Births in the Autonomous Region Over 30 Years], 中国广播网 [*China National Radio*], 11 July 2007, <https://web.archive.org/web/20260504030717/https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-07-11/185312186303s.shtml>.

¹⁰⁸ Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, June 2020, <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Rosana Hughes, “Up to 4.5 million lives could be lost under China’s Uyghur crackdown,” *Courthouse News Service*, <https://www.courthousenews.com/up-to-4-5-million-lives-could-be-lost-under-chinas-uyghur-crackdown-study/>.

¹¹⁰ Adrian Zenz, “‘End the dominance of the Uyghur ethnic group’: an analysis of Beijing’s population optimization strategy in southern Xinjiang,” *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 40, No. 3 (2021), pp. 291–312, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>.

imposed birth limits was the single most common reason for internment, confirming that the detention system itself is a tool of genocide.¹¹¹

- (e) *Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group*: Nearly one million Uyghur and other Turkic children have been forcibly separated from their parents and placed in state-run boarding schools and orphanages. China's own 2019 education statistics confirm at least 880,500 children held in boarding facilities — a figure that excludes preschools, kindergartens and orphanages,¹¹² meaning the true number of children separated from their families likely exceeds one million. Children of detained parents are administratively redefined as “orphans” and confined in state institutions, where they are stripped of their mother tongue, indoctrinated to renounce their identity, and forced to pledge allegiance to the occupying power.¹¹³ UN experts confirmed the “large-scale removal of children, mainly Uyghur, from their families,” warning that this will “lead to a loss of connection with their families and communities and undermine their ties to their cultural, religious and linguistic identities.”¹¹⁴

35. The OHCHR concluded on 31 August 2022 that the crimes in East Turkistan “may constitute crimes against humanity;” China denounced the report and rejected its recommendations.¹¹⁵ Fifty-one nations condemned the crimes at the UN General Assembly Third Committee.¹¹⁶ The United States government has formally determined that these acts constitute an ongoing genocide.¹¹⁷ The parliaments of Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Ireland have recognized

¹¹¹ Adrian Zenz, “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang,” *Journal of Political Risk*, vol. 8, No. 2 (February 2020), <https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/>.

¹¹² “2019年新疆维吾尔自治区教育事业发展统计公报” [2019 Statistical Bulletin on the Development of Education in the XUAR] (Index No. 010183592/2020-01457), 26 April 2020, Section IV(iii), p. 4, <https://archive.is/QZ2eM>.

¹¹³ Olivia Enos, “The Urgent Need to Defend Uyghur Children and Their Families,” *Forbes*, 8 May 2023, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviaenos/2023/05/08/the-urgent-need-to-defend-uyghur-children-and-their-families/>.

¹¹⁴ OHCHR, “China/Xinjiang: Forced separations and language policies targeting Uyghur children,” September 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/china-xinjiangs-forced-separations-and-language-policies-uyghur-children>.

¹¹⁵ “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” 31 August 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assessment.pdf>; see also “China denounces OHCHR report on Xinjiang,” *Global Times*, 1 September 2022, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1274387.shtml>.

¹¹⁶ United Kingdom Government, “Joint Statement on human rights violations in Xinjiang at the UN Third Committee,” 21 October 2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-statement-on-human-rights-violations-in-xinjiang-at-the-un-third-committee>.

¹¹⁷ “US: China ‘committed genocide against Uighurs,’” *BBC News*, 20 January 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55723522>; see also “Blinken says genocide in Xinjiang is ongoing,” *Reuters*, 22 April 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/blinken-says-genocide-xinjiang-is-ongoing-report-ahead-china-visit-2024-04-22/>.

the crimes as genocide and crimes against humanity.¹¹⁸ The International Criminal Court has yet to open an investigation despite four submissions of evidence by the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile since 2020.¹¹⁹ The failure of existing human rights mechanisms to end the genocide or hold China accountable after more than a decade confirms that decolonization is not merely the appropriate framework but the only one capable of ending the colonial domination that produced the genocide and the only one capable of the effective guarantee and observance of human rights for the peoples of East Turkistan.

V. Legal Basis for Inscription and Decolonization

36. The right of self-determination is grounded in the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 1(2) and 55); General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV); Resolution 1654 (XVI), which mandates this Committee to examine all situations to which the Declaration applies. East Turkistan satisfies every criterion of Principle IV of Resolution 1541 (XV). Under Principle V, it is subject to colonial domination in every respect: occupation imposed by military invasion seventy-six years ago, systematic extraction of natural resources, and demographic colonization through millions of state-directed Chinese colonists. The “autonomous region” designation is a colonial construct designed to deny self-determination while maintaining a false appearance of self-governance.

37. The Committee possesses the authority to examine any situation of colonial domination and recommend its inscription as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The Committee’s own practice of accepting petitions originated in 1961 precisely because an administering power — Portugal — refused to recognize its territories as Non-Self-Governing and refused to transmit information under Article 73(e).¹²⁰ China’s refusal to acknowledge the colonial character of its administration of East Turkistan replicates that defiance. The Committee’s mandate requires it to act, not defer to the objections of the administering power.

38. Resolution 1514 (XV), paragraph 6, on territorial integrity applies exclusively to sovereign states, not colonial territories. Resolution 2625 (XXV) confirms that a colony

¹¹⁸ East Turkistan Government in Exile, “International Responses to the Crisis in East Turkistan (so-called Xinjiang),” last updated 5 March 2026, <https://east-turkistan.net/international-responses-to-the-crisis-in-east-turkistan-so-called-xinjiang/>.

¹¹⁹ “ICC urged to investigate China’s treatment of Uyghurs,” *Voice of America*, 23 June 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/icc-urged-to-investigate-china-s-treatment-of-uyghurs/6630740.html>; see also “Uyghur Genocide and the Tajik Connection: A New Fight at the International Criminal Court,” *Bitter Winter*, 1 July 2022, <https://bitterwinter.org/uyghur-genocide-and-the-tajik-connection-a-new-fight-at-the-international-criminal-court/>.

¹²⁰ UN General Assembly, Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), A/RES/1699, 19 December 1961, <https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unga/1961/7238>.

possesses a status separate and distinct from the state administering it until the right to self-determination has been freely exercised. The peoples of East Turkistan have never been afforded that exercise. Their separate and distinct status is unextinguished. Resolution 2625 (XXV) further prohibits the forcible denial of self-determination as a violation of both the prohibition on the use of force and the right of self-determination.

39. The International Law Commission includes the right of self-determination, the prohibition of aggression, and the prohibition of genocide in its list of peremptory norms of international law — *jus cogens* (2022).¹²¹ The PRC has violated all three. The ICJ held in *Western Sahara* (1975) that even historical ties of allegiance do not constitute territorial sovereignty, and cannot override the right to self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people.¹²² In *Chagos* (2019), the Court held that the failure to complete decolonization is a continuing wrongful act and that self-determination is an obligation *erga omnes*.¹²³

40. The PRC's armed invasion of East Turkistan on 12 October 1949 constitutes an act of aggression under Resolution 3314 (XXIX), which reflects customary international law and applies without prejudice to questions of recognition or United Nations membership.¹²⁴ The PRC's systematic extraction of East Turkistan's energy, mineral, and agricultural resources for Chinese benefit constitutes a continuing violation of the permanent sovereignty of the peoples of East Turkistan over their natural resources under Resolution 1803 (XVII).¹²⁵

41. Resolution 3070 (XXVIII), reaffirmed by Resolution 45/130 of 1990, affirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial domination by all available means and the importance of the speedy granting of independence for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights. Every member of this Committee and the General Assembly is under an obligation to support the East Turkistani people's right to self-determination.

¹²¹ International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General International Law (*Jus Cogens*), with commentaries, 2022, Conclusion 23 and Annex, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_14_2022.pdf.

¹²² International Court of Justice, *Western Sahara*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12, 16 October 1975, <https://www.icj-cij.org/index.php/node/103758>.

¹²³ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2019, 25 February 2019, <https://www.icj-cij.org/node/105778>.

¹²⁴ UN General Assembly, Definition of Aggression, A/RES/3314(XXIX), arts. 1, 3(1) & 5(1), 14 December 1974, <https://ijilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/General-Assembly-Resolution-3314.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, A/RES/1803(XVII), 14 December 1962, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/general-assembly-resolution-1803-xvii-14-december-1962-permanent>; see also José Antonio Peña-Ramos et al., "The role of natural resources in the territorial conflicts of Xinjiang and Tibet in the People's Republic of China," *Revista UNISCI*, No. 62 (May 2023), <https://doi.org/10.31439/UNISCI-174>.

42. The principle of *ex injuria jus non oritur* holds that no rights arise from illegal acts.¹²⁶ China's occupation of East Turkistan was illegal from its first moment. No passage of time transforms that illegality into sovereignty. The right of self-determination cannot be extinguished by the unilateral act of the occupying power, by the passage of time, or by the failure of the international community to act.¹²⁷

43. The peoples of East Turkistan are not a "minority" or an "indigenous people."¹²⁸ They are the native peoples of a colonized nation with a documented history of independent statehood, entitled to the full exercise of self-determination, including the speedy restoration of their independence.

VI. Established Precedents

44. The Committee's own precedents establish both its authority and its obligation to act. New Caledonia was inscribed in 1986 notwithstanding administration by France, a permanent Security Council member, on grounds including demographic colonization. French Polynesia was re-inscribed in 2013 after its removal without a genuine act of self-determination. Western Sahara remains on the Non-Self-Governing Territory list as a land-contiguous territory where the occupying power claims historical sovereignty. East Timor, invaded by Indonesia and illegally annexed, was restored to independence. East Turkistan meets or exceeds every one of these precedents: demographic colonization on a vastly larger scale than New Caledonia, no act of self-determination ever having occurred as in French Polynesia, an occupying power claiming historical sovereignty as in Western Sahara, and a sovereign state destroyed by military invasion as in East Timor — with no treaty of cession, no plebiscite, and no instrument reflecting the free and genuine will of its peoples.

45. In every case, inscription proceeded without the administering power's consent. France, a permanent Security Council member, claimed Algeria as integral French territory for 132 years before decolonization in 1962 and objected to the inscription of New Caledonia and the re-inscription of French Polynesia; both were inscribed regardless. No Charter provision, no Committee rule, and no General Assembly resolution creates an exception for China. The precedent is established. The right to self-determination, and the

¹²⁶ Stimson Doctrine (1932); UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (1970); ICJ, *Namibia* (1971).

¹²⁷ UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV); ICJ, *Namibia* (1971); ICJ, *Western Sahara* (1975).

¹²⁸ East Turkistan Government in Exile, "Uyghurs Reject 'Indigenous People' Designation, Citing Incompatibility With Fundamental Goal of Restoring East Turkistan's Independence," 6 December 2021, <https://east-turkistan.net/uyghurs-reject-indigenous-people-designation-citing-incompatibility-with-goal-of-restoring-east-turkistans-independence/>; "How Labeling Uyghurs a 'Minority' Enables China's Denial of East Turkistani Self-Determination," *The East Turkistan Post*, 5 January 2026, <https://turkistanpost.com/how-labeling-uyghurs-a-minority-enables-chinas-denial-of-east-turkistani-self-determination/>.

obligation of decolonization that flows from it, are inalienable. They must be applied consistently.

46. The Committee currently oversees territories with populations as small as forty-seven. The peoples of East Turkistan number in the tens of millions. No colonized people of this scale has ever been excluded from the Committee's agenda for this long. If the peoples of East Turkistan do not merit the protection of the decolonization framework, then no people on earth does. The Committee's continued silence emboldens the occupying power and renders the international community complicit in the ongoing genocide and colonial domination.

VII. The Conflict of Interest of the PRC

47. The People's Republic of China has been a member of the C-24 since 1971. It sits on the body mandated to examine situations of colonial domination while simultaneously administering what this petition establishes is the largest colonial territory by both population and area on earth. China's presence gives it direct influence over the agenda, the hearing of petitioners, and the drafting of recommendations concerning all colonial conduct — including its own. This is without precedent in the history of the Committee — no member has ever administered a colonial territory of this scale while sitting in judgment of colonial conduct — and without parallel in any legal system. It violates the principle of *nemo iudex in causa sua* — that no party may be judge in its own cause.¹²⁹ No procedural arrangement, no political consideration, and no claim of sovereignty can override the right to self-determination, a *jus cogens* norm from which no derogation is permitted. The Committee has an obligation to ensure that the PRC's structural conflict of interest does not determine the fate of the national question of East Turkistan.

VIII. Formal Requests

48. The petitioners hereby respectfully request:

First: That the Committee recommend to the General Assembly the inscription of East Turkistan as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Chapter XI and Resolution 1541 (XV).

Second: That the Committee recommend the designation of the PRC as the administering and occupying Power over East Turkistan and require it to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter.

¹²⁹ Peter Tomka, President of the International Court of Justice, Statement at the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law, New York, 24 September 2012: "The legal maxim "*nemo iudex in causa sua*" (no-one can be a judge in his own case), confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice already in 1925, should equally be applicable in relations between States," https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Statement_ICJ.pdf.

Third: That the Committee recommend the General Assembly condemn the PRC's colonial domination, occupation, and alien subjugation of East Turkistan and reject its claim to sovereignty as having no basis in law, in the historical record, or in the free and genuine will of the peoples of East Turkistan.

Fourth: That the Committee recommend the General Assembly determine that the crimes against humanity documented by the OHCHR and the genocide recognized by multiple governments and parliaments constitute instruments of colonial subjugation, and that the appropriate remedy is decolonization and the full exercise of self-determination.

Fifth: That the Committee recommend the General Assembly affirm the inalienable right of the peoples of East Turkistan to self-determination and to the speedy restoration of their independence as the effective guarantee and observance of their fundamental human rights.

Sixth: That the Committee call upon all States, specialized agencies, and other competent organizations of the United Nations system to offer moral, material, and any other assistance to the peoples of East Turkistan in their just struggle for self-determination and independence, to refrain from any action that would aid or abet the PRC's occupation and subjugation of East Turkistan, and to ensure the full implementation of the Declaration as it applies to East Turkistan.

Seventh: That the Committee recommend the General Assembly address the PRC's conflict of interest arising from its simultaneous membership on the C-24 and its identification as an administering and occupying Power, and take all appropriate measures to ensure the impartial consideration of the national question of East Turkistan.

Eighth: That the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile and the East Turkistan National Movement be recognized as petitioners and afforded the opportunity to address the Committee and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at all relevant proceedings.

IX. Conclusion

49. No case before this Committee has ever presented a stronger basis for inscription and decolonization than that of East Turkistan. More than eighty former colonies have achieved independence through the decolonization framework. The peoples of East Turkistan seek the same right — while they still exist to claim it. The majority of the nations seated on this Committee survived colonial subjugation and were liberated through the very framework to which this petition appeals. The Declaration this Committee was created to implement states that “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights” and that “immediate steps shall be taken” to end it “unconditionally.” Seventy-six years of occupation have passed. A genocide now entering its thirteenth year continues. No step has been taken to end it. To refuse to act is not caution —

it is complicity in the destruction of a people and a renunciation of every principle the United Nations was founded to uphold. To deny this petition would be to declare that the strength of the colonial power determines whether international law is enforced. The Charter admits no such distinction. Neither do the people of East Turkistan.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Mamtimin Ala', written in a cursive style.

Dr. Mamtimin Ala
President, East Turkistan Government-in-Exile

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Salih Hudayar', written in a cursive style.

Salih Hudayar
Foreign Minister, East Turkistan Government in Exile
President, East Turkistan National Movement